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Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant?
Reflections on the Judicial Role in
Environmental Law
Daniel A. Farber*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal environmental law is over a quarter century old,
dating from the passage of the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) in 1969 and the Clean Air Act (CAA)2 in 1970.
Since then, the Supreme Court has decided roughly two or
three environmental law cases per year-or somewhere be-
tween fifty and one hundred cases altogether.3 To assess the
Court's relevance, imagine that all those cases were wiped off
the books. If the Court had never granted certiorari in a single
environmental case, would the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or other federal agencies operate any differently?
Would firms be subject to different federal regulations? In
short, how different would environmental protection be today?
The answer, according to my thesis, is "not much." During
the past twenty years, the Court's decisions have not substan-
* Acting Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs, Associate Dean
for Faculty and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
This essay was originally delivered on April 23, 1996, as the reinaugural lec-
ture for the Fletcher chair. I would like to thank Ann Burkhart, Jim Chen,
Richard Lazarus, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful comments.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) is best known for its mandate for environmental impact state-
ments. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1994) (requiring all federal agencies to con-
duct environmental impact studies under certain circumstances).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994).
3. Given the inherent vagueness of the term "environmental law case," it
does not seem worthwhile to make this figure more precise. This essay cites
approximately 30 cases, which seems a fair sample size. See also Richard E.
Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 424-31 (1989)
(listing 65 environmental law decisions between 1960-1988).
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tially affected environmental regulation. In the first few years
of the environmental era, the Court did hand down some sig-
nificant decisions.' Since the late 1970s, however, the Court
has been largely irrelevant.'
If I am correct about the Court's basic irrelevance, then at
the very least the Court has been wasting docket space it could
have used for some more constructive purpose. More impor-
tantly, the Court has failed to take a leadership role in a criti-
cal area of federal law. Admittedly, the key policy decisions of-
ten belong to Congress or the EPA, but the Court could also
play an important and constructive role in environmental law.
Ideally, the Court could help provide direction in interpreting
environmental statutes, improve the process by which lower
courts review agency decisions, integrate innovative environ-
mental statutes into the general body of existing law, and pro-
vide leadership in those significant policy areas that Congress
has left to the judiciary rather than the EPA. The Court's fail-
ure to address these tasks has left environmental policy less
coherent, effective, and fair than it might otherwise have been.
Of course, without the ability to rerun history, no defini-
tive way exists to prove how much or how little difference the
Court has actually made. Given the general importance of the
Supreme Court in American government, surely some effect
would occur if the Court completely withdrew from any area of
federal law. Still, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to
4. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (holding
that the Endangered Species Act requires enjoining the completion of the
nearly finished Tellico Dam because the Dam would destroy the habitat of an
endangered species); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
127 (1977) (upholding the EPA's authority under the Clean Water Act to limit
discharge in existing plants through industry-wide regulations setting forth
effluent standards); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (holding
that economic and technological infeasibility may not be considered by the
EPA Administrator in reviewing a state implementation plan under the Clean
Air Act).
Another notable "building block" opinion which underlies much of current
administrative law was Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415-16 (1971) (establishing a three-part test for assessing whether an
administrator's action was justifiable); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 740 (1972) (establishing the basis for the modern law of environ-
mental standing).
5. Shifts in general views about the legal process may help account for
the change in the Coures role. See. Robert Glicksman & Christopher Schroe-
der, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW &
CON EMP. PROBS. 249 (1991) (arguing that changes in political assumptions
parallel the changes in judicial decisions).
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identify specific instances in which the Court's decisions have
really shaped federal environmental regulation in the past two
decades. 6
To test the irrelevance hypothesis, consider a thought ex-
periment. Suppose the Supreme Court were to embark on a
campaign to minimize its own influence on the development of
environmental law and policy, while still continuing to hear
some environmental cases. What strategies would it use to do
so? The following seems a plausible list of strategies:
" Hear a lot of cases with unique or atypical facts, so the
holdings will be irrelevant or difficult to apply in more
typical cases.
" Refuse to hear cases in some vital areas of environ-
mental law.
" Shunt as many issues as possible away from the judici-
ary entirely.
" Adopt a strong policy of deferring to administrative
agencies on environmental issues.
" When a decision on the legal merits cannot be avoided,
base it on an extremely narrow, technical ground having
little general significance.
To a remarkable extent, the Supreme Court's actual per-
formance in environmental law since the mid-1970s mirrors
these hypothetical strategies.7 That is, the Court behaves al-
most as if it had deliberately undertaken to minimize its own
influence on environmental law. Constitutional scholar Alex-
ander Bickel wrote of the "passive virtues" that allow the Court
to avoid thrusting itself too far into controversial areas of pol-
icy. In the Court's environmental law record, however, we find
the paradox of hyperactive passivity.
6. This essay is limited to the subject of environmental regulation by the
federal government. The Court's preemption and dormant Commerce Clause
opinions have had a greater effect on state and local environmental regula-
tion. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973) (holding that federal regulation of aircraft noise preempts state and
local airport noise controls); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clark-
stown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994) (overturning state and local efforts to regulate
interstate transportation of waste). But see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (upholding
the state's power to ban new nuclear plants pending final approval by federal
government of permanent nuclear waste disposal plan).
7. It would be interesting to compare the Courts performance in envi-
ronmental law with other technical areas such as tax or regulation of tele-
communications and transportation. Informal remarks by colleagues suggest
some strong similarities.
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Parts II and III of this essay review how the Court has se-
lected environmental cases and avoided basing its decisions on
strong substantive grounds. They provide an impressionistic
overview of the ways in which the Court has avoided respon-
sibility for the development of environmental law. Obviously,
an institution as important as the Supreme Court cannot avoid
issuing significant opinions from time to time, but these deci-
sions are few and far between in environmental law. On the
whole, the Court has not played a major role in shaping envi-
ronmental regulation or liability rules. Part IV considers four
alternative roles the Court might play in the future.
II. THE COURTS ERRATIC CASE SELECTION
The Supreme Court has limited time and many issues to
consider outside environmental law. Yet, it tends to fritter
away docket space on oddball environmental cases with little
precedential value. In the meantime, large, important areas of
environmental law have escaped its attention.
A. THE LURE OF THE UNIQUE
Too often, the Court has heard cases with quirky, intrigu-
ing facts that present no issue of any broad significance.8 Un-
der NEPA, for example, it chose to hear one case involving
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome after Three Mile Island,9 and
another involving hypothetical impact statements for "nuclear
8. A related, but more understandable problem arises when the Court
devotes substantial resources to a problem that seems significant but actually
has little practical importance. One example is presented by fundamentally
different factors (FDF) variances under the Clean Water Act, which were the
subject of two full-blown opinions and discussion in a third, but proved nearly
so uncommon in reality as to qualify for listing as an endangered species of
regulatory instrument. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 129
(1985) (upholding EPA's position that toxic chemicals may receive FDF vari-
ances); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 84 (1980)
(upholding EPA's approach to best practicable technology (BPT) variances); E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977) (postponing
consideration of FDF variances for BPT and upholding EPA ban on variances
for the best available technology (BAT)); see also William Pedersen, Turning
the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 86 & n.81 (1988) (showing
how the EPA receives few applications for FDF variances and grants even
fewer).
9. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S.
766, 774 (1983) (holding that psychological trauma triggered by reopening of
plant is not cognizable under NEPA because it was not proximately caused by
a change in the physical environment).
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ready" facilities that may or may not contain warheads. 10 Nei-
ther issue is likely to recur.
A more serious problem occurs when the Court does ad-
dress a significant issue, but chooses such an atypical case as a
vehicle that lower courts cannot interpret the Court's message.
Consider the following three examples.
Ohio v. Kovacs" involved the important issue of whether
environmental clean-up orders are dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. 2 Typically, the government seeks an injunction or is-
sues an administrative order requiring a firm to clean up a
toxic waste site; the firm then seeks to escape the order
through bankruptcy.1 3 The Court chose to address this issue,
however, in a peculiar case in which the cleanup mandate had
already been converted to a monetary debt.14 It held that this
debt was discharged, without confronting the more fundamen-
tal issue-whether cleanup orders generally are dischargeable
in bankruptcy.1 5 This holding has provided little guidance to
lower courts, which have remained divided on the question. 16
Far from clarifying the law, the Court only muddied the issue
further.
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo17 involved another recurring
issue: whether a court may excuse a polluter from full envi-
ronmental compliance because of hardship or other equitable
considerations. Unfortunately, the Court chose a bizarre case
in which to address the issue. The "polluter" in question was
the Navy; the "pollution" consisted of bombs and shells that fell
into the sea during military exercises." The lower court found
that the Navy had actually improved the local environment
10. Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (holding that,
because presence or absence of nuclear weapons at the facility is classified in-
formation, plaintiffs cannot satisfy burden of proof of showing that an envi-
ronmental impact study (EIS) is required).
11. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
12. Id. at 275.
13. Id. at 276-77.
14. Id. at 282-83.
15. Id. at 283-85.
16. Compare United States v. Whizco, Inc., 841 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir.
1988) (cleanup obligation dischargeable), with In re Torwico Elec., Inc., 8 F.3d
146, 151 (3d Cir. 1993) (cleanup obligation nondischargeable). See generally
Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm of Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1055,
1068-77 (1994) (examining environmental cleanup obligations under the exist-
ing bankruptcy system).
17. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
18. Id. at 307.
19971
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indirectly, by scaring away fishing vessels and tourists.19 Not
surprisingly, the Court held that the military exercises could
continue while the Navy applied for a permit.2" Also not sur-
prisingly, this decision shed little light on the more typical case
of the industrial discharger facing economic hardship.
21
The final example, and probably the best known of the
three cases, is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'2 a
takings case. One of the most difficult takings issues arises
when a regulation protecting wetlands or beaches drastically
decreases the economic value of the regulated land. The Court
chose a case, however, that allegedly involved not a drastic de-
crease but a total erasure of land value. 23 This is extremely
unusual and, as the dissent pointed out, was probably not true
even in Lucas itself.4 Nevertheless, the Court devoted great
energy to resolving this question (which had largely been set-
tled by dicta in prior cases anyway).25 En route, it delivered a
series of general remarks about the Takings Clause whose
relevance, if any, to the more general case of partial diminution
of value is entirely unclear.
B. THE TOXIC BLIND SPOT
While wasting time on oddball cases, the Court has al-
lowed important areas of environmental law to languish in ob-
scurity. Nowhere is this more true than with respect to toxic
substances.
One basic issue regarding toxic substances is whether
regulation is warranted based on low or unquantifiable evi-
dence of risk. The Court has not given clear leadership on the
issue. Its only decision on risk management arose under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) rather than an
19. Id. at 310 n.4.
20. Id. at 319-20.
21. See United States v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077,
1087 (3d Cir. 1987) (analyzing a more typical case involving an industrial dis-
charger facing economic hardship).
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
23. Id. at 1007.
24. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (finding a taking when
an owner is denied the economic use of his land); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding that once regulation goes beyond a
certain level it constitutes a taking).
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environmental statute, and the Court split 4-1-4.26 Even on its
own terms, the plurality opinion left key issues unresolved, in-
cluding the level of risk which can be considered substantial
and the amount of supporting evidence required before an
agency can act." The Court has never considered the issue in
the more frequent context of an "imminent hazard" injunc-
tion.28
It has also made little contribution in two areas that pro-
vide the bulk of litigation in environmental law. The first is
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), better known as the Su-
perfund law. While the Court has addressed some peripheral
CERCLA issues,29 it has inexplicably left major issues un-
touched, such as officer and shareholder liability, discharge-
ability of future CERCLA claims in bankruptcy, lender liabil-
ity, and contribution.3" The second area is toxic tort litigation.
Asbestos cases have substantially impacted the federal courts'
litigation statistics. Huge sums have changed hands; unprece-
dented use has been made of bankruptcy and other devices, yet
the Court has never addressed these issues. Nor has the Court
26. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980).
27. Id. at 652-58. Among other defects, the plurality opinion is quite dif-
ficult to square with the plain language of the statute, ignores the caselaw in
the lower courts about risk assessment, and seems to misapprehend the level
of risk which modern regulatory statutes reach (considering it to be question-
able, for example, whether a 1 in 1000 risk is "significant"). See American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 505-06 n.25 (1981) (discussing
the issue of risk assessment but adding little substance). The Court, however,
has not returned to the issue since. See also Howard A. Latin, The
"Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Un-
der Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982) (criticizing the Courtfs approach
in determining the burden of proof in the benzene case).
28. See 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)-(3) (1994) (describing the Administrator's
authority with regard to pesticide regulation); 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1994) (auth-
orizing the Administrator to commence a civil suit for seizure and relief relat-
ing to imminently hazardous substances); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994)
(allowing citizens to file civil actions to obtain injunctions and relief); see also
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251, 1255 (1996) (holding that a
citizen may not bring a suit to recover costs of toxic clean up if at the time of
the suit, the hazard is wholly past and thus cannot be considered "imminent").
29. For example, in its recently overruled opinion in Union Gas the Court
held that state governments were liable under CEROLA. Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
30. For background on these issues, see ROGER FINDLEY & DANIEL
FARBER, ENvIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 569-602 (4th ed. 1995).
1997] 553
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addressed major issues in toxic tort cases like Agent Orange,31
such as proof of causation and novel class action settlements.
The Court has not addressed important criminal enforce-
ment issues that have divided commentators and the lower
courts. 32 Nor has it considered the major issues arising under
the complex regulatory system governing hazardous waste dis-
posal,33 or the more general regulatory system for manufacture
and use of toxics.34 In short, it has steered clear of most of the
environmental issues of the greatest practical interest to prac-
ticing lawyers.
III. DEFERENCE, TECHNICALITIES, AND OTHER
EVASIVE TACTICS
So far, we've been concerned with the Court's selection of
cases. When the Court does hear cases posing significant is-
31. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), affd, 818 F.2d. 145 (2d Cir. 1987). The one case that is even close to
the causation issue is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582
(1993) (alleging birth defects were caused by prenatal ingestion of drug). In
Daubert, the Court did attempt to clarify the general admissibility of expert
testimony, but without addressing the questions regarding epidemiological
and clinical data addressed in Agent Orange. Id. at 2796-98; see also Allen v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 404-43 (D. Utah 1984) (providing detailed
discussion of what plaintiffs must show to establish a causal connection be-
tween Government's open-air atomic testing and plaintiffs' cancer, through
support of epidemiological studies and other data), rev'd on other grounds, 816
F.2d 1417 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). On the class action is-
sues, see generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER
MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995) (proposing methods of restructuring mass tort
litigation), reviewed in Charles T. Kimmett, Book Note, Rethinking Mass Tort
Law, 105 YALE L.J. 1713 (1996); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can
They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 858 (1995) (discussing
developments in class action cases and the limits of judicial power to imple-
ment tort reform).
32. See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into
Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
867, 868-75 (1994) (describing the poor assimilation of environmental law into
criminal law); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83
GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995) (describing three recent cases, highlighting problems in
environmental criminal law, and offering suggestions for reform); Richard J.
Lazarus, The Reality of Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Environ-
mental Crimes: A Reply to the Department of Justice, 83 GEo. L.J. 2539 (1995)
(responding that suggested reforms would not interfere with appropriate
criminal prosecution and conviction of environmental crimes).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (1994).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
554 [Vol. 81:547
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sues, it has used other techniques to distance itself from the
process of making environmental policy.
A. CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
Declining to hear appeals is a less effective means of re-
ducing judicial influence on policy than is keeping cases out of
federal court entirely. Standing doctrine restricts challenges to
administrative decisions and thereby leaves agencies, rather
than courts, with the final word on policy issues. Two recent
opinions by Justice Scalia are notable because of their effort to
restrict environmental standing, and because they expressly do
so in the name of shunting issues away from the courts toward
other branches of government.
In the first case, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,35
the plaintiffs claimed that the government had used illegal
procedures to determine future uses of public lands. They
based their standing on the use of several specific tracts by
their members. Specifically, they alleged that several members
used tracts "in the vicinity" of lands covered by two of the gov-
ernment decisions.36
Justice Scalia rejected these standing allegations on two
grounds. First, even as to the two specific tracts, the claims
were insufficient because they alleged only proximity to, rather
than actual presence on, the affected tracts.37 Or, to put it
more simply: close only counts in horseshoes. Second, even if
the plaintiffs had established standing with respect to a par-
ticular tract, their standing would not extend to the agency
program as a whole, even if the same illegal procedures were
used uniformly. Instead, the plaintiffs were required to use
what the Court called a "case-by-case approach"38 for each tract
of land. Justice Scalia observed that this approach might be
frustrating, but said that courts were not the place to seek sys-
temic reform. Instead, the plaintiffs should seek such reform
within the other branches.39
35. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
36. Id. at 880.
37. The requirements of standing are "assuredly not satisfied by aver-
ments which state only that one of respondent's members uses unspecified
portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining
activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental ac-
tion." Id. at 889.
38. Id. at 894.
39. Id. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs were only seeking to enforce existing
1997] 555
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Justice Scalia continued his campaign against environ-
mental standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." The ulti-
mate issue in Defenders, which the Court never reached, was
whether the Endangered Species Act41 applies to U.S. govern-
ment actions outside the United States. The plaintiffs alleged
that they would be harmed in several ways by U.S. funded de-
velopment projects in various countries, including Egypt and
Sri Lanka.42 The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing, in the process striking down the citizen suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act.
The plaintiffs alleged several forms of injury. Two mem-
bers alleged they had visited the relevant areas of Egypt and
Sri Lanka in the past and hoped to do so again in the future.
Because the projects could lead to increased rates of extinction
for endangered and threatened species in the project areas, the
plaintiffs could lose the opportunity to observe those species.
Justice Scalia rejected the plaintiffs' allegations about future
travel as a basis for standing, dismissing them as mere "'some
day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will be."43
Nor was he impressed with what he called the plaintiffs' more
"novel" standing theories." ("Novel" obviously is not a compli-
ment in his lexicon.) Under the first theory, called the ecosys-
tem nexus, "any person who uses any part of a 'contiguous eco-
system' adversely affected by [agency action] has standing even
if the activity is located a great distance away."45 Although the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) is aimed in part at the protec-
tion of ecosystems, Scalia refused to find a cause of action on
behalf of people who use parts of the ecosystem not
"perceptibly affected" by the government's action.46 Justice
Scalia was equally unimpressed by the plaintiffs' other two
theories, which he scathingly rejected.47
statutory requirements, it may be somewhat inaccurate to characterize them
as seeking "reform."
40. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994).
42. 504 U.S. at 563.
43. Id. at 564. The plaintiffs' unspecified future plans failed to give rise
to "actual or imminent" harm as required for standing. Id.
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 566.
47. One theory, which the plaintiffs called the animal nexus, would have
granted standing to anyone who studies or observes an endangered species.
The other theory, the vocational nexus, would grant standing to anyone with a
556 [Vol. 81:547
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Like National Wildlife Federation, Defenders is explicitly
based on the premise that certain tasks are better left to other
branches of government. Justice Scalia's basic objection to the
ESA's citizen-suit provision was that it gave the courts the
duty of ensuring that environmental laws are obeyed by the
government.48 Instead, Scalia contended, this is part of the duty
to "'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,'" which is
assigned to the President.49
The Court has also restricted judicial power in another re-
spect in the name of deference to other branches of govern-
ment. Prior to 1981, federal courts had jurisdiction over inter-
state pollution disputes under the federal common law of
nuisance. In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan,50 the
Court held that Congress had unintentionally preempted this
body of law by passing the Clean Water Act. "Congress has not
left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the
courts through application of often vague and indeterminate
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but
rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a
comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
administrative agency."51 The motivation for this holding can-
not be found in the statute, which reflects a desire to preserve
all other legal restraints on water pollution. Rather, it is found
earlier in the opinion. There, the Court had declared that fed-
professional interest in the animal. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 566 (1992). To say that Justice Scalia was unpersuaded is an under-
statement. He seemed scandalized that such a theory would even be pro-
posed:
Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the
Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the
Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the Agency for
International Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary
[of Interior] regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka .... It
goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and fan-
tasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered
species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single
project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no
more specific connection.
Id. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 571-77.
49. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). Because of its unusual
facts, Lujan seems to have had little effect on the more typical uses of citizen
suits against polluters. See NRDC v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493,
503 (3d Cir. 1993) (providing a generous definition of citizen standing under
the Clean Water Act).
50. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
51 Id. at 317.
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eral common law involves policymaking of a kind which should
be exercised by the federal courts only as a last resort, if there
is no viable alternative. 2 As in the standing cases, the Court's
overriding goal was to minimize the federal judiciary's role in
environmental law.
B. SUBSTANTIVE DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES
Environmental law has contributed some celebrated cases
to the general field of administrative law. Ironically, however,
most of these cases are best known for reducing the judiciary's
impact on the administrative process. The persistent theme in
the Court's environmental decisions of the last twenty years
has been deference to administrative agencies. In Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,53 the Court ended a
string of lower court decisions which had attempted to reshape
agency procedures. The rationale for those decisions was that
judges, while ill-suited to pass judgment on the merits of
agency decisions, have useful expertise about procedural mat-
ters. The argument was that the Administrative Procedure
Act "merely establishes lower procedural bounds and that a
court may routinely require more than the minimum when an
agency's proposed rule addresses complex or technical factual
issues or 'Issues of Great Public Import.'"54 The Court viewed
this position as a patently unwarranted intrusion on agency
discretion." Consequently, it upheld the agency's resort to
minimal rule-making procedures in order to avoid having to
consider the problem of nuclear waste disposal in depth.
"IT]his much is absolutely clear," the Court said, "Absent con-
52. Id. at 312-17.
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their
own rules of decision. The enactment of a federal rule in an area of
national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in
doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully
insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their
elected representatives in Congress ....
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however,
and when there exists a "significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law," the Court has found it
necessary, in a "few and restricted" instances to develop federal
common law.
Id. at 312-13 (citations and footnotes omitted).
53. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
54. Id. at 545 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 49).
55. Id. at 546-48.
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stitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances...
agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure"
and pursue their inquiries in their own way. 6
At issue in Vermont Yankee was the agency's procedural
discretion in the absence of explicit statutory requirements.
The Court has also been anxious to preserve agency discretion
even in the face of explicit congressional commands. One of
those commands, embodied in NEPA, requires an environ-
mental impact statement whenever a major federal action has
a significant environmental effect.17 In determining whether
an agency has complied with the statutory procedure, however,
the Supreme Court has instructed courts to use a deferential
standard of review. Failure to prepare an impact statement
can be reversed only if the agency was arbitrary and capricious
in concluding that environmental impacts were insignificant.5 8
An agency's discretion also extends to the interpretation of
the statute governing its own activities. Under the Chevron
doctrine, first announced in a Clean Air Act case,59 a court
must uphold any reasonable administrative interpretation of a
statute unless clearly contrary to legislative text or intent
0
As the Court explained:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either po-
litical branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, rec-
oncile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges'
personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Con-
gress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent admini-
stration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agen-
cies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Govern-
ment to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or inten-
56. Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143
(1940)).
57. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1994).
58. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-77
(1989). The Court has also been highly deferential in reviewing the contents
of impact statements. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87,
97-106 (1983) (upholding an EIS which stated an environmental impact as
zero though agency lacked basis for this conclusion); Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp., v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 549-55 (1978) (holding that energy con-
servation was not a sufficiently obvious alternative to a nuclear plant for
agency to require EIS discussion).
59. Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
60. Id. at 842-45.
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tionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the admini-
stration of the statute in light of everyday realities.6'
Indeed, in its anxiety to preserve agency discretion, the
Court has sometimes been willing to ignore statutory language
expressly limiting that discretion. A recurring issue under
NEPA had been whether the statute imposes only a paperwork
requirement or whether it actually requires the agency to take
environmental factors into account. Relying on dicta in previ-
ous cases, the Court held in 1989 that the statute is purely
procedural.62 This holding simply ignored the plain language
of the statute. Section 102(1) of NEPA provides as follows:
"The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accor-
dance with the policies set forth in this [Act] .... Not sur-
prisingly, in the course of holding the statutory policies to be
merely "precatory," the Court failed to discuss this section.'
No doubt judicial review of compliance with NEPA's general
policies would have been deferential, but even deferential re-
view was apparently too much, given the Court's desire to re-
move the judiciary as much as possible from issues of environ-
mental policy.
This urge toward deference does not necessarily translate
into anti-environmentalist positions. It depends on the agency
to which the Court is deferring. 6 On occasion, deference has
61. Id. at 865-66. For recent discussions of Chevron, see WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 192-93 (2d ed. 1994) (noting reasons for
the Court's holding and suggesting the test is not determinative); Linda R.
Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 65 (1994) (offering an explanation of why the Court adopted
the Chevron doctrine); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73
TEY L. REV. 83 (1994) (arguing that the Chevron doctrine, as currently ap-
plied, focuses on the first step, thereby encouraging political compromise in
contravention of public policy, and advocating that the courts focus on the
second step and scrutinize the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation).
62. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-53
(1989).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1994).
64. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. For a critique of Robertson, see Nicho-
las C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 545-46
(1990).
65. For examples of deference to pro-environmental agency positions, see
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992) (stating that the EPA inter-
pretation of state drinking water standards in interstate controversy context
is entitled to substantial deference); United States v. Riverside Bayview
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actually undermined the Court's own interpretation of an envi-
ronmental statute. The Court has conducted an unrelenting
campaign against NEPA. Although it has heard more than a
dozen cases since the statute's passage, the Court has never
once upheld a NEPA claim.6 But the damage to NEPA has
been buffered by another strand of the Court's opinions, man-
dating deference to interpretations of NEPA by the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ).67 Since the CEQ has taken a
rather expansive view of NEPA, its views and the Court's have
tended to cancel each other out.
C. THE SEDUCTION OF TECHNICALITIES
When the Court has decided environmental cases on the
merits, it has not infrequently resolved them on narrow techni-
cal grounds. Not surprisingly, these decisions have had little
impact on the development of the law. Two cases involving the
Clean Air Act illustrate this point.
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States" involved a consti-
tutional challenge to the statute. Like many other environ-
mental statutes, the Clean Air Act provides that regulations
must be challenged in a particular forum within a limited pe-
riod after they are promulgated. 9 Otherwise, in a later en-
forcement action, the invalidity of the regulation cannot be
raised as a defense.7" A defendant convicted of a regulatory
violation challenged the constitutionality of this limitation on
judicial review.7 ' Rather than confront the constitutional is-
sue, however, the Court invalidated the regulation on far nar-
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (stating that Corps of Engineers' rea-
sonable construction of a statute is entitled to deference).
66. See Daniel A. Farber, Disdain for 17-Year-Old Statute Evident in
High Court's Rulings, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1987, at 20 (analyzing cases occur-
ring in the first seventeen years of NEPA and noting that the Court, in ten
cases at that point, had never upheld a claim); Levy & Glicksman, supra note
3, at 416-20 (discussing Court's refusal to implement attorney's fees provi-
sions in NEPA); see also RODGERS, supra note 61, at 816 (noting an unbroken
string of Supreme Court cases rejecting interpretations of NEPA advanced by
environmental groups). But see David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hos-
tile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L.
551, 554-65 (1990) (concluding that factors other than hostility explain the
Supreme Court's NEPA record).
67. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (holding that CEQ
regulations are entitled to "substantial deference").
68. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
69. Clean Air Act § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1994).
70. Id. § 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(2).
71. Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 277-78.
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rower grounds. It held that the Clean Air Act authorized only
regulations that specified permissible amounts of air pollution,
whereas the regulation before the Court attempted to control
air pollution by specifying certain work rules. 72 The constitu-
tional issue was avoided, never to reappear on the Court's
docket. Congress amended the statute to authorize work rules
as a form of pollution control.73 The Court's decision vanished
without a trace.
A more recent example is General Motors Corp. v. United
States.74  The lower courts were divided about whether the
EPA could assess "noncompliance penalties" while the EPA's
response to a variance request was overdue.75 The Court
ducked the issue by holding that the EPA's action was not
subject to any deadline, as both the lower courts and Congress
had assumed.76 Shortly thereafter, Congress revised the dead-
line provisions in a way that makes their applicability unmis-
takable, but failed to clarify the issue of noncompliance penal-
ties.7 Once again, by basing its ruling on an evanescent
technicality, the Court guaranteed the ultimate irrelevance of
its decision.
These Clean Air Act cases are unusual in that they origi-
nally presented broader issues. Quite often, the Court chooses
cases that from the beginning present only technical issues,
such as the effects of incorrect notice on citizen suits78 or the
burden at different points of the suit to show the likelihood of
continuing violations. 79 These are not insignificant issues for
public interest litigators in citizen suit cases, but they hardly
have a major impact on the path of the law.
IV. FOUR FUTURE SCENARIOS
If my thesis is correct, the Supreme Court has failed to
play a substantial role in the development of environmental
law. Is this a failure we should regret? Or, on the contrary,
72. Id. at 288-89.
73. Clean Air Act § 112(d)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)(D).
74. 496 U.S. 530 (1990).
75. Id. at 535-36.
76. Id. at 538-39.
77. Clean Air Act § 110(k)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1)(B) (1994).
78. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 23 (1989).
79. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 US.
49, 64(1987).
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has the Court found its appropriate role in the environmental
arena-as a spectator rather than a player?
To test the desirability of a more effective judicial role,
consider one last thought experiment. Suppose the Justices
were now to make a concerted effort to play a more effective
role in environmental law. Would the consequences be desir-
able? Without the benefit of a crystal ball, any prediction is
hazardous; but we can at least explore the possibilities. Four
possible scenarios present themselves.
1. Scenario #1: Continued Irrelevance
One possibility is that, whatever the intentions of the Jus-
tices, they would be unable to develop any coherent body of
environmental doctrine, and instead would merely flounder.
Perhaps the Justices simply lack the individual skills or ex-
pertise to make a coherent contribution; for example, it might
be impossible for them to identify the right cases to review. Or
perhaps the Court would be too fractured to produce anything
more than a meandering stream of plurality opinions, which
would contribute little to legal development. If so, an effort by
the Court to become a "player" in environmental law would be
ineffective, but harmless; the Court would remain as irrelevant
as it is today.
2. Scenario #2: Judicial Activism
Alternatively, the Court might embark on a course of judi-
cial activism, crusading for (or more likely against) environ-
mentalism. Judicial activism of this kind would be highly
problematic. Although there is room for disagreement about
whether cases like Chevron correctly assess the judicial role,
those cases do identify important reasons why Congress and
the executive agencies should normally lead in making envi-
ronmental policy. Unlike courts, agencies have the expertise to
address complex technical issues. In contrast to the judiciary,
moreover, Congress and the agencies can address issues sys-
tematically, rather than case-by-case. Finally, both Congress
and the agencies are democratically accountable for the deci-
sions they make; judges are not. An effort by the courts to
usurp the leadership of the political branches would be at best
unproductive and at worst a fiasco. Fortunately, given the cur-
rent temper of the Court, this form of activism seems improb-
able, since it would require a conversion from extreme passiv-
ity to frenetic activity in the environmental arena.
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So far, our thought experiment has produced a null result
(no change despite the Justices' intentions) and an unlikely al-
ternative (substantive activism). There are two other possi-
bilities which deserve more careful attention. In the optimistic
scenario, the Court takes a creative role in developing policy,
though a role subsidiary to Congress and the agencies. In the
pessimistic scenario, it dedicates itself to defending the exist-
ing legal fabric against innovations.
3. Scenario #3: The Legislature's Junior Partner
Because environmental statutes are so complex, and
agencies are given so much responsibility for implementing
them, courts may seem to have little room for initiative. This
perception is incorrect, however. Despite the crucial roles of
Congress and the executive branch, areas remain in which the
Court could make important contributions. Many critical is-
sues cannot be resolved by agencies. For example, CERCLA
cases raise crucial issues about how to allocate responsibility
for environmental harms. Similarly, toxic tort cases raise
perplexing questions about causation, and "imminent hazard"
cases require a court to decide how to respond to very small
risks of very serious harm. 80 The Court's role in reviewing
agency decisions raises a final, crucial issue: how to structure
judicial review so as to foster a high-quality, democratically ac-
countable regulatory process.
Environmental law has contributed some important inno-
vations to the judicial and administrative processes. Among
the judicial innovations are the use of fee-shifting, citizen suits,
and private enforcement actions to support the role of citizens
as "private attorneys general." In the administrative context,
innovative agenda-forcing provisions, like those in NEPA and
the ESA,81 force agencies to keep environmental issues on their
80. Similar kinds of issues come before the Court in reviewing adminis-
trative actions, though in these cases, the Court's role will usually be secon-
dary to the agency's. As a court of appeals judge, Justice Breyer thoughtfully
addressed some of these issues. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900
F.2d 429, 434-38 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing whether courts must defer to EPA
decisions regarding proper injunctive relief); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d
497, 501-03 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing factors courts should consider in de-
termining propriety of injunctive relief).
81. Other innovations include: recognition of preservation and develop-
ment as basic social values; technology-forcing, risk management, marketable
permits and other novel regulatory strategies; and strict, retroactive liability
for large-scale injuries to the environment.
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agendas. Working out the parameters of such innovations is a
challenging task.82 To do it effectively will require not judicial
activism, but rather the quiet judicial creativity of a Harlan or
a Cardozo-creativity at the retail rather than wholesale level,
so to speak.
Thus, the Court could make important contributions to
improving environmental regulation. It could also undertake
the critical task of integrating innovative environmental legis-
lation into the existing body of the law. In undertaking these
tasks, the Court must be careful to respect the principle of leg-
islative supremacy.83 It must also recognize the risk of unduly
impeding the regulatory process through excessive interven-
tion.84 Nevertheless, there is genuine room for judicial creativ-
ity, even where the Court must operate in Congress's shadow.8
As Peter Strauss has pointed out, this kind of activity is well
within the traditional conception of the judicial role.86  The
proper task for courts is not to lead a crusade for or against
environmentalism, but rather to bring intelligent legal analysis
to bear on the implementation of the nation's environmental
policies.
How likely is this optimistic scenario? The ideal environ-
mental law judge would combine a deep knowledge of environ-
mental policy and the administrative process with a gift for
judicial craftsmanship. Such paragons may be rare, if not non-
existent. On the current bench, Justice Breyer has the strong-
est claim to environmental expertise.8 7 Justice Ginsburg may
82. This task involves resolving gaps, ambiguities, and inconsistencies
within environmental statutes. It also involves working out how the new fea-
tures of these statutes relate to existing law in fields ranging from bankruptcy
law to class action rules. The challenge is to derive some kind of sensible legal
order out of our multiple, sprawling, and complex environmental statutes.
83. Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy,
78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283 (1989).
84. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience,
27 LOY. L.A_ L. REV. 791, 805-06 (1994).
85. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legis-
lature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
875, 895-900 (1991) (approving "beneficial cooperation" between legislatures
and common law decisionmaldng).
86. Peter Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common
Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 429,436-42.
87. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARDs
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (positing that systematic and careful
implementation of risk regulation provides more cost effective protection of
social values). See generally William Funk, Justice Breyer and Environmental
Law, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 735, 741-43 (1995) (arguing that Justice Breyer's
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also have acquired some expertise on the D.C. Circuit, which
has a large environmental law docket. Justices Stevens and
Souter seem at this point the closest approximations to Car-
dozo or Harlan in terms of judicial craftsmanship. The likeli-
hood of the optimistic scenario thus depends on whether these
Justices can pool their skills and expertise in a cooperative en-
terprise, and whether they can pick up support from either
Justices O'Connor 8 and Kennedy 9 or from future appoint-
ments. The Court's recent opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,90 upholding a
regulation classifying habitat modification as an impermissible
taking under the Endangered Species Act, illustrates the po-
tential importance of such coalition-building.9 1
4. Scenario #4: The Judiciary as Immune System
In the previous scenario, the Justices took a sympathetic
attitude toward the efforts of Congress and the EPA, attempt-
ing to fill gaps and make adjustments in related legal doc-
trines. In a less optimistic scenario, the Justices might view
environmental law as a foreign body invading federal law, and
seek to limit or isolate the threat of legal change. The goal
would not be to eliminate environmental regulation, but to
subsume it within the existing legal order, minimizing change
beyond what Congress has expressly mandated. In some re-
spects, this scenario is reminiscent of the Blackstonian re-
sponse to statutes, which attempted to minimize their impact
in order to protect the common law from legislative tamper-
ing.92
record shows firm commitment to effective environmental law enforcement);
Brent L. Hoffman, Comment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Business Friend and
Environmental Foe? An Analysis of Justice Breyer's Judicial and Non-
Judicial Works Concerning Environmental Regulation, 100 DICK L. REV. 211,
212-15 (1995) (discussing Justice Breyer's background and experience in ad-
ministrative law).
88. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 589 (1992), Justice
Blackmun's environmentalist dissent was joined, somewhat surprisingly, by
Justice O'Connor.
89. Justice Kennedy's separate opinions in Defenders and Lucas, for ex-
ample, indicate some receptivity even in constitutional cases to the public val-
ues embodied in environmental statutes. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 580-81
(Kennedy, J. concurring); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1032-36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2418 (1995).
91. Of course, coalition-building was probably made easier because the
decision involved deference to an agency position. Id. at 2416.
92. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpreta-
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The Court's response to innovations often has been
grudging. Fee-shifting is a good example. After refusing to
take the lead in awarding attorney's fees to public interest rep-
resentatives,93 the Court has remained unsympathetic to statu-
tory fee-shifting.94 NEPA has been the subject of particular-
and unrelenting-judicial hostility. The Court has attempted
to shoehorn NEPA into the general body of administrative law,
rather than recognize the need for an accommodation between
the new concept of agenda forcing and traditional concepts of
agency discretion.95 To take a final example, when the Court
wanted to distinguish permissible from excessive government
regulation of land, it reverted to the ancient law of nuisance.96
Justice Scalia has been the primary proponent of this
Blackstonian approach to environmental law.97 In Sweet
Home, for example, his dissent relied strongly on traditional
game law, going back to Norman times, in order to resist a
broad reading of the Endangered Species Act.98 The textualist
approach that he has championed has tended to frustrate ef-
tion, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (1989) (discussing historical development
in statutory interpretation).
93. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263-
64 (1975) (rejecting "private attorney general" theory of fee recovery).
94. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 687-92 (1983)
(construing statute which deliberately avoided phrase "prevailing party" to
allow fee awards only to prevailing parties); see also Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1966-67 (1994) (rejecting award of attorney's
fees in private response cost recovery actions under CERCLA); City of Bur-
lington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 564-67 (1992) (holding award enhancement for
contingency fees not allowed under Solid Waste Disposal Act and Clean Water
Act); cf West Va. Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88 (1991) (using Toxic
Substances Control Act fee-shifting provisions to justify a narrow reading of
civil rights statute that also shifts fees).
95. See Farber, supra note 66 (arguing that NEPA departs from usual
administrative law).
96. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-32
(1992) (denying landowner compensation for right to develop land if state nui-
sance and property law withheld the right in the original title).
97. Consider his standing opinions, which are most strongly characterized
by their opposition to the "private attorney general" concept. In Lujan v. De-fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992), he seems to view this concept
almost as a violation of the President's prerogatives under Article H.
98. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115
S. Ct. 2407, 2422-23 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of Scalia's
approach, see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Prog-
ress, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1546, 1551-53 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994)).
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forts at coherent regulatory policy in other fields. 9 This ap-
proach is firmly supported by the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas,100 and has won occasional support from Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.10 1
The future will turn in large part on whether, among the
younger Justices, Scalia assumes intellectual leadership of the
Court (leading to Scenario #4), or whether Breyer and Souter
assume that role (leading to Scenario #3). If neither side is
able to cement a working majority, then the most likely result
is Scenario #1, in which the Court remains incapable of playing
a coherent role in the making of environmental policy. Thus, if
the Justices were individually determined to make a stronger
contribution to environmental law, the result could be either
neutral, beneficial, or harmful. The outcome turns on whether
a majority can agree on a specific conception of the judicial role
in environmental law, and on what that conception might be.
99. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 15-22
(1995) (discussing banking regulation); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 773-75 (1995) (discussing
trucking regulations).
100. Justice Thomas has displayed an actively hostile attitude toward en-
vironmental protection in at least one opinion. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson
County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1920 (1994) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (characterizing environmental interests as parochial, in con-
trast with the national interest in generating electricity). Also, see Citizens
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas,
J.), in which Justice Thomas took an uncommonly narrow view of the defini-
tion of alternatives under NEPA. Judge Buckley, himself a noted conserva-
tive jurist, said in dissent that Thomas's opinion would "undermine" NEPA
and turn the requirement that an EIS discuss reasonable alternatives into "an
empty exercise." Id. at 210. For further discussion of this issue, see Peter J.
Kirsch & Conrad M. Rippy, Defining the Scope of Alternatives in an EIS After
Citizens Against Burlington, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,701 (Dec.
1991).
101. Particularly during the Rehnquist Court, the Justices have sometimes
seemed "out of sync" with the general public, which has adopted environmen-
talism as a consensus value. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 5, at
272-76 (discussing the ways in which public support of environmental issues
has altered policy); Patricia Wald, Environmental Postcards from the Edge:
The Year That Was and the Year That Might Be, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,182 (Apr. 1996) (discussing the depth of public support for environ-
mental issues). It would be hard to justify greater judicial involvement in
environmental law, if that involvement translates into an actively counterma-
joritarian role.
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V. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has failed for a vari-
ety of reasons to play an effective role in environmental law. It
has often chosen to hear cases involving insignificant issues or
peculiar facts, which therefore have little precedential value.
It has reduced the role of the federal judiciary in environ-
mental law by narrowing standing for environmental plaintiffs
and by increasing judicial deference toward administrative
agencies. Important areas of law, in which the courts rather
than the agencies have the primary responsibility for environ-
mental policy, have been left to the lower federal courts, with
little or no guidance from the Supreme Court. In short, for the
past twenty years or so, the Court has either stayed on the
sidelines or participated ineffectually in the making of envi-
ronmental law.
It is not altogether clear what would happen if the Court
were to attempt to play a more effective role. It might simply
prove incapable of doing so; it might attempt to play too active
a role in making policy; or it might devote its energy to a fruit-
less campaign in favor of formalism and literal statutory inter-
pretation. Alternatively, it might play a useful and creative
role in adjusting the fabric of the law to deal with modern envi-
ronmental issues.
Whether we should celebrate or mourn the Court's ineffec-
tiveness depends, then, on whether the Justices are prepared
to play a constructive supporting role in environmental law.
The effective exercise of power is not an end in itself-certainly
not for courts. An ineffective court, however, can accomplish
nothing, for good or for evil. What we must hope for is a judici-
ary that is both effective and judicious.
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